Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Freedom, Perception and Radical Reflection

Abstract

This text seeks to understand the nature of radical reflection that philosophy must be and how it differs from an intellectualistic or Cartesian reflection. While the latter is conceived as all-powerful, capable of constituting the world on its own, radical reflection recognizes, on the contrary, what is this side of it, namely, the vast carnal zone that Merleau-Ponty characterizes as 'prior objective' or 'unreflective.' Only by understanding radical reflection as freedom, invention, and appropriation of meaning does it seem possible to resolve the contradiction between intellectualism and embodied consciousness. This is to elucidate the force of phenomenology where it seems to show its weakness, precisely in the work of understanding the world in relation to consciousness. For this purpose, the work of Merleau-Ponty, particularly the Phenomenology of Perception, is explored based on an immanent analysis of the concepts of perception and freedom inherent in the phenomenological considerations of the French philosopher. As a conclusion of this analysis, the possibility arises to understand that, given the tendency of radical reflection to try to transgress its limits, it could become an intellectualistic or idealistic reflection, while freedom could become a blockage in acquired experience. This would then require both radical reflection and freedom to relate in a continuous and moderate manner in the world of perception to configure a qualified and not impoverished experience of the world.