Survival, Transition and Oil: The 2026–2027 Strategic Game in Venezuela

Abstract

This article develops a prospective analysis of the Venezuelan political system for the period 2026–2027, conceptualizing it as an asymmetric survival game among five actors: the Executive, an internationally and institutionally recognized opposition, a socially and territorially dispersed opposition, the military leadership, and external powers (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2018; V-Dem Institute, 2026). Based on a systematic review of literature (2008-2020 for regime classification; 2019-2026 for context), sectoral series, multilateral documents, and 47 field notes (2025–2026), heterogeneous utility functions are modeled, and plausible Nash equilibria are derived under incomplete information. The central hypothesis posits that the observed equilibrium is low-temperature: actors maximize continuity at tolerable costs (Ross, 2015). Methodologically, it integrates strategic modeling and scenario analysis with probabilities estimated through a heuristic-expert Bayesian method. Overcoming previous dichotomies, the opposition typology is reformulated by distinguishing six dimensions of political capital that do not necessarily coincide within a single actor (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011). The results identify three scenarios: A) authoritarian stabilization (0.55), B) breakdown due to exogenous shock (0.30), and C) negotiated transition (0.15). It is concluded that the viability of a stable negotiated transition depends inevitably on the emergence of an organic national leadership capable of integrating dispersed social and territorial sectors, transcending the political ceiling of current polarized actors (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Operational monitoring indicators are proposed to improve early warning.