Logic and Ontology: Law of Identity Considered fromthe Perspective of Markus Gabriel’s Realist Ontology

Abstract

This article aims to provide a critical review of the philosophical problem of identity between a formal-logical system and ontology—understood as the philosophical discipline concerned with the meaning of existence—in order to propose the modal implications of Markus Gabriel’s realist ontology of fields of sense as the most reasonable theoretical option for addressing this issue. The initial assumption is the negative position of the impossibility of an absolute identity between logic and ontology without a prior work of semantic interpretation. The article critically examines ontological systems that equate themselves with formal-logical systems, such as Alain Badiou’s ontology, to argue why they fail to establish such identity. Subsequently, we adopt a positive stance, suggesting the possible identity between logic and ontology based on the ontology of fields of sense. We outline the path toward an ontological theory of identity that interprets the principle of identity under a semantic point of view. This ontology holds that objects are presented in the logical form of descriptions; thus, the identity of an object is established through a correspondence between the object, and the field of sense in which it appears according to its guiding sense, which is conceived as a universal concept. This has significant modal implications and marks a step forward toward an ontological theory of identity.