SEARLE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DERIVING AN "OUGHT" FROM AN "IS"

Abstract

The analysis of prescriptive and descriptive languages is something that Analytic Philosophy has undertaken. Along such a work, it faces problems such as the socalled "naturalistic fallacy" or "is-ought problem" in which thinkers such as Hume and some misinterpretations of Moore's work –regarding the "natural" and "non-natural" properties of language– have stated that it is impossible to derive an "Ought" from an "Is", concluding that: "[...] no set of descriptive statements can entail an evaluative statement". However, John Searle's (1969) writings on language reveal that: "[...] language, of all places, is riddled with counter-instances to the view that no evaluations can follow from descriptions" because to speak about the validity of an argument, which requires of descriptive language, it is necessary to use evaluative notions that are characteristic of descriptive language and, therefore, we are obliged to logically relate both statements. Such an analysis of language enables an exploration in the field of Morality, though not being directly addressed by Searle. Therefore, the solution of such a problem would lead to consider the possibility of thinking moral statements as statements rationally valid by relating them to descriptive statements. Thus, in the following paper Searle's arguments in favor of deriving an "Ought" from an "Is" will be presented, and in the last section a suggestion of how such a theory might bring us close to a foundation of the validity of moral statements will be offered.