El papel de las intuiciones en el problema probatorio del mal: una propuesta racionalista moderada

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Rafael Miranda-Rojas
  • Biografía

    Doctor of Philosophy, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile. Professor at the Facultad de Ciencias Religiosas y Filosóficas, Universidad Católica del Maule (Chile).

Resumen

Este artículo pretende evaluar el alcance del vínculo entre el problema evidencial del mal y el papel de las intuiciones como un caso de acceso epistémico sui generis. Para ello, se analizarán en primer lugar los supuestos teóricos presentes en la comprensión de lo que es una intuición y, en consecuencia, lo que es una creencia intuitiva como caso de creencia no inferencial y a priori. Siguiendo a Church et al. (2020), un punto principal de esta investigación es resaltar el vínculo entre las intuiciones y el evidencialismo, tal y como se considera en el problema evidencial del mal. Esto permitirá un análisis racionalista moderado y empíricamente informado de lo que se entiende como evidencia respecto a la posible (o probable en algunas lecturas) no existencia de Dios, si es el caso de que hay al menos una instancia de mal gratuito (mal injustificado) en el mundo. Para fortalecer esta interpretación a favor de un vínculo a priori - a posteriori como una forma de responder al argumento del mal y su papel derrotista (Oliveira, 2019), se considerarán dos supuestos presentes en la discusión, y su plausibilidad: i) que las razones a priori no se entienden estrictamente como pruebas para la creencia religiosa de una proposición p; ii) que la irracionalidad de la creencia religiosa surge de la ausencia de justificación de la ocurrencia de un evento de maldad. Sostengo que existe una tensión entre i) y ii), específicamente en lo que respecta a la ausencia de evidencia que permita sostener la incompatibilidad entre el mal gratuito y la inexistencia de Dios.

Palabras clave:
Evil, Irrationality, Rationality, Evidence, Intuition, Fallibility, Skeptical Theism, Atheism, Agnosticism, A priori Mal, Irracionalidad, Racionalidad, Evidencia, Intuición, Falibilidad, Teísmo escéptico, Ateísmo, Agnosticismo, A priori

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