Two Alternatives of Angelic Ontology
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Abstract
This work presents and discusses two major systematic alternatives for the ontology of angels. Those alternatives are associated with Saint Bonaventure and Saint Thomas Aquinas. In the first one, angels are conceived as having some sort of physical structure. However, in the second one, angels are purely spiritual creatures not composed by any kind of physical structure. Aquinas defends a very detailed theory about the angelic nature. Angels have connatural intentional forms and no perception of individual states of affairs. Each one of them is the only exemplar of its species. Angels are immediately saved or condemned after their creation by a unique act of will. All of these contentions are discussed. They are not necessary for a reasonable conception of angels as purely spiritual creatures, nor do they seem correct. A corrected Thomistic theory of angelic nature, though, does not appear decisively superior over a Bonaventurian one.
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