Religious Belief, Evidentialism, and Skeptical Theism
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Abstract
The purpose of the article is to develop a line of argument in favor of a religious
belief in the existence of God, in such a way that it is possible to hold that: i) it
is a rational belief and ii) it is non-dependent on contingent evidence. Provided
this is correct, a consequence would be that the position called new atheism is
not a rational position, and that it corresponds to an evidentialist reductionism
(i.e., that only evidence is the reason to believe, in this particular case, in the
existence of God). In order to achieve this purpose, first, it is discussed in what
sense what Priest (1998) understands as a rational contradictory belief is not
applicable to a case of religious belief. Afterwards, the new atheism is analyzed
(Fumerton, 2013), as well as the main argument held by this position in favor of the irrationality of the religious belief, i.e. the evidence against the rationality
of the belief in the existence of God, the evidentialist argument from evil. This
path corresponds to an evidentialist reductionism and it dismisses the reasons
of faith as a proper way to argue in favor of the existence of God. Therefore, it
is argued that such a position is mistaken: the reasons of faith are valid, rational
reasons in favor of the belief of the existence of God. Lastly, the scope of the
skeptical theism and the main argument why its dismissal seems plausible are
considered.
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