Ingeniería conceptual e innovación teórica: esbozo de un modelo

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Carlos Muñoz-Suárez
  • Biografía

    Logos. Research Group in Analytic Philosophy, Universidad de Barcelona, España.

Resumen

Todas las áreas del conocimiento se cimientan de diversas formas en una multiplicidad de productos derivados de la ingeniería conceptual. Este artículo tiene un espíritu programático: busca introducir un modelo del funcionamiento de la ingeniería conceptual y, en particular, de cómo ocurre la innovación conceptual en contextos de indagación teórica. En la primera sección, se describe el vecindario dialéctico en que nació el estudio explícito de la relevancia, el alcance, los mecanismos y los objetivos propios de la ingeniería conceptual. En la segunda sección, se introduce una distinción entre ingeniería conceptual evaluativa e ingeniería conceptual instrumental a partir de la distinción entre uso conceptual comprometido y uso conceptual instrumental. A partir de esto, se muestra que los casos descritos de ingeniería conceptual evaluativa y de ingeniería conceptual instrumental pueden ser formalmente entendidos como derivados de una misma función, que, dado un problema conceptual, mapea soluciones conceptuales posibles para generar valores de éxito o de fracaso. En la siguiente sección, se introduce un tercer tipo de ingeniería conceptual: la ingeniería conceptual constructiva, cuyo núcleo es una función (de innovación conceptual) que mapea soluciones dentro de un espacio representacional de alternativas no consideradas y genera nuevo contenido conceptual. El modelo introducido abre un campo fructífero y novedoso de investigación acerca de las condiciones y de los factores que dan lugar a la innovación teórica mediante la ingeniería conceptual.

Palabras clave:
Ingeniería conceptual, Innovación teórica, Conceptos, Cambio conceptual, Innovación conceptual, Metafilosofía, Metateoría científica, Ingeniería evaluativa, Ingeniería constructiva, Ingeniería conceptual de novo Conceptual Engineering, Theoretical Innovation, Concepts, Conceptual Change, Conceptual Innovation, Metaphilosohy, Metatheory of Science, Evaluative Engineering, Constructive Engineering, de novo Conceptual Engineering

Detalles del artículo

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