Skeptical Theism, Free Will Skepticism and Atheism: Pondering the Scope of Moral Paralysis

Rafael Miranda-Rojas

Abstract


In this paper, I aim to show that Skeptical Theism (ST) implies the rejection of Free Will Skepticism (FWS). This is so because ST holds the so-called evidential argument from evil against theism. This argument presupposes free will (as a hidden premise), conducting this way to a skeptical conclusion without questioning the plausibility of FWS in the first place. I argue that this kind of conflict between two skeptical scenarios removes the validity of ST and FWS: It is ad hoc to assume a skeptical scenario S1 (ST) that supports thesis T1, and implicitly rejects the consequences of another skeptical scenario S2 (FWS) that discards T1. This implies the rejection of the so-called Moral Paralysis (MP) and shows a tension between Moral Skepticism (MS), ST and FWS. Moreover, the links between skepticism, dogmatism and atheism, as a case of epistemic defeasibility, are discussed.

Keywords


Skeptical Theism; Free Will Skepticism; Evidential argument; Evil; Moral Paralysis.

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18566/cueteo.v46n105.a06